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New Actors in Egyptian Post-Revolutionary Politics: Soccer Hooligans 
Kelly Poupore 
 
 
"You don't want to involve football hooligans into politics, or piss them off."
1
 
- Adel Bassiouni, a civilian onlooker 
 
"The two biggest political parties in Egypt are Ahly and Zamalek."
2
 
- Assad, leader of Al Ahly’s football ultras 
 
“Soccer is a massive thing in Egypt. It is like religion. In most countries you are born 
Jewish, Muslim or Christian. In Egypt you were born Ahly and Zamalek. People would 
not ask your religion, they would ask whether you were Ahly or Zamalek.”3 
- Adel Abdel Ghafar 
 
“Soccer is bigger than politics. It’s about escapism. The average [soccer] fan is a guy 
who lives in a one bedroom flat with his wife, mother-in-law and five kids. He is paid 
minimum wage and his life sucks. The only good thing about his life is that for two hours 
on a Friday he goes to the stadium and watches [soccer].”4 
- Assad, leader of Al Ahly’s football ultras 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the overthrow of former Egyptian President Mubarak in February 2011, 
Egypt has been thrown into instability and uncertainty.
5
 Despite taking power amidst a 
democratic revolution, current Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has been widely 
criticized as implementing authoritarian policies that are similar to those of President 
                                                        
1 Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Day of the Hooligans, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept. 15, 2011, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/15/day_of_the_hooligans (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).  
2 James Montague, Egypt’s politicized football hooligans, ALJAZEERA ENGLISH, Feb. 2, 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/20122215833232195.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
3 James M. Dorsey, Pitched Battles: The Role of Ultra Soccer Fans In The Arab Spring – Analysis, Dec. 
24, 2012, 17 MOBILIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 411, 414 available at 
http://www.eurasiareview.com/24122012-pitched-battles-the-role-of-ultra-soccer-fans-in-the-arab-spring-
analysis-2/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
4 James M. Dorsey, Soccer Fans Emerge as Driver in Egyptian Protests, Jan. 30, 2011, MIDEAST SOCCER 
BLOG, available at http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2011/01/soccer-fans-emerge-as-driver-in.html (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
5
 Olga Khazan, Why Egyptians are angry at Morsi, in charts, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 8, 2012, 
available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/08/why-egyptians-are-angry-at-morsi-in-
charts/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
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Hosni Mubarak.
6
 Since 2011, a new kind of revolutionary violence has taken hold; 
termed “soccer hooligans” or “ultras”, young, male Egyptian soccer fans have taken to 
the streets -- and the soccer pitch -- to voice their discontent with the current regime.
7
 
Many recent commentators have argued that what is going on behind the Egyptian ultras 
is about politics, not football.
8
 This appears to be true on some levels, but what is also 
clear is that Egypt’s “soccer hooligans” are different from their European counterparts.9 
Unlike Europe’s fierce regional hooligan rivalries that are widely apolitical, in Egypt, 
football and politics are so intertwined that there is almost no way to untangle them.
10
  
In the last few months, Egyptians have become increasingly angry over rising 
unemployment, the effect of the global economic crisis, and widening political 
divisions.
11
 Having successfully ousted a repressive regime in large part through en 
masse demonstrations, and encouraged from their success, the people are more prone to 
descend into the street to voice their discontent.
12
 Those who do protest are becoming 
more and more militant, led in part by the ultras.
13
 Violence between fans and against 
police has increased in post-revolutionary Egypt, culminating in a huge brawl in which 
                                                        
6 Id.  
7 Arslan Lehmici, Quand la guerre du foot annonçait la revolution [When Football Wars Announce 
Revolution], Feb. 2, 2012, SLATE AFRIQUE, available at http://www.slateafrique.com/551/foot-egypte-
algerie-violences-revolte-moubarak (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
8 Laurent Dubois, The Ultras, the Military and the Revolution, SOCCER POLITICS/THE POLITICS OF 
FOOTBALL, available at http://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/2012/02/02/the-ultras-the-military-and-the-revolution/ 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
9 Id.  
10 Id. 
11 Laurent Dubois, Soccer protests highlight Egyptian president Morsi’s fragile ties to the military, SOCCER 
POLITICS/THE POLITICS OF FOOTBALL, available at http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2013/03/soccer-
protests-highlight-egyptian.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
12 Ahmed Aboul Enein, Labour strikes and protests double under Morsi, Apr. 28, 2013, DAILY NEWS 
EGYPT, available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/28/labour-strikes-and-protests-double-under-
morsi/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).  
13 Protesters clash with police near Egypt’s presidential palace, Apr. 26, 2013, AL ARABIYA ENGLISH, 
available at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/26/Egypt-protesters-clash-with-
police-near-Cairo-s-presidential-palace-.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
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73 people were killed after a soccer match in the Suez city of Port Said.
14
 These events 
coupled with the protests against death sentences handed down for 21 ultras involved in 
the Port Said massacre has left some analysts concerned that football fans might provoke 
a new revolution in Egypt.
15
 Considering the deteriorating state of the Egyptian economy 
and the weak central government, if the unrest continues, the general population may 
unite behind the ultras against the Morsi regime.
16
  
This paper argues that the ultras in Egypt are not just soccer hooligans, but a new 
hybrid political movement. Though the end results of this movement are not complete, I 
will first discuss the soccer hooligan movement in Europe, and how it differs from the 
Egyptian movement. I will then examine the Egyptian revolution in the context of the 
Arab Spring in order to put the Egyptian hooligans into their proper context. Next, I will 
explain where and how the ultras in Egypt fit into the revolution. Finally, I examine what 
this ultra movement could mean for future legal affairs in Egypt and, perhaps, the rest of 
the Middle East region.  
Soccer Hooliganism in Europe 
 “Hooliganism” is the term used broadly to describe disorderly, aggressive and 
often violent behavior perpetrated by spectators at sporting events.
17
 Soccer hooliganism, 
in particular, is thought to have originated in the present day United Kingdom.
18
 Soccer 
                                                        
14 Deadly riots in Egypt after football hooligan death sentences, EURONEWS, Jan. 27, 2013, available at 
http://www.euronews.com/2013/01/27/deadly-riots-in-egypt-after-football-hooligan-death/ (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2013).  
15 Id.  
16 Robert Walker, Egypt: Too Big, Too Late to Save?, Apr. 29, 2013, HUFFINGTON POST, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-walker/egypt-too-big-too-late-to_b_3178979.html (last visited Apr. 
29, 2013). 
17 Football Hooliganism, POLITICS.CO.UK, available at http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/football-
hooliganism (last visited Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Hooliganism].  
18 Hooliganism, supra note 17. Though the official origins of soccer hooliganism are disputed, one of the 
earliest instances occurred in 1314, when King Edward II banned football in England. At that stage the 
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teams began usually as a social organization for members of an ethnic, economic, or 
religious group that served as the community focal point for that group.
19
 As regional 
rivalries developed in late 19
th
 Century in Britain, concerns were frequently voiced about 
groups of “roughs” causing trouble at matches by attacking not only opposing supporters, 
but also players and referees.
20
 As gang-presence and a police crackdown increased in the 
UK during the 1960s and 1970s, hooligans began meeting outside of the pitch in pre-
organized brawls.
21
 Elsewhere in Europe, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Hungry and 
France were experiencing similar acts of hooliganism which were largely attributed at 
least in part to a visiting British team’s presence at an away match.22 Overtime, many 
“ultra” fans on the European continent adopted the brawling habits of many English 
teams.
23
 
While many European countries have experienced domestic hooligan problems – 
intense conflict between supporters of rival clubs – these have not typically translated 
into hooligan support for their respective national teams.
24
 Even during the World Cup, 
there are generally not outbreaks of violence to support the national team. This could be 
due to football’s origins during pre-nationalistic Europe or due to a general lack of 
nationalistic tendencies post World War II. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
game was described as a nasty free-for-all involving rival villages kicking a pig's bladder across the local 
heath. Edward II believed the disorder surrounding matches might lead to social unrest or possibly even 
treason if players were left to their own devices. See also Sean Ingle and Mark Hodgkinson, When did 
football hooliganism start? THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 13, 2001, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2001/dec/13/theknowledge.sport (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).  
19 Football Hooligans, CRACKED, available at http://www.cracked.com/funny-2156-football-hooligans/ 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
20 Hooliganism, supra note 17. 
21 Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research, Football and Football Hooliganism: Fact Sheet 1, Jan. 
2001, available at http://www.furd.org/resources/fs1.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter “Sir 
Norman”]. 
22 Id at 89. 
23 Id at 90. 
24 Id. 
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Specifically in Europe, many commentators also mention soccer teams working 
class roots as a factor contributing to its links with aggressive and disorderly behavior.
25
 
In Europe studies suggests that the average hooligan is generally in their late teens or 
their early 20s and are mainly in manual or lower clerical occupations, and coming from 
a working class background.
26
 This is not to say that only working class people have been 
involved in soccer brawls, but by and large, such circumstances tend to be the norm.
27
  
Though alcohol seems to play heavily into hooligan offenses in English matches, 
it doesn’t appear that alcohol causes outbreaks of hooligan violence. Many Danish, 
Scottish and Irish football supporters get very drunk at matches, yet the supporters of 
teams in these nations are now among the least violent of all major football followings.
28
 
On the other hand, ultra fans in Italy drink very little, but some of the most violent ultra 
outbreaks have occurred there.
29
 Overall, the links between heavy drinking and violence 
seem to be both culturally and situationally specific and at least some of those ultras seem 
to be aggressive in certain circumstance with or without being inebriated.  
In short, there is no single, specific, universally adopted definition of football 
hooliganism, though the similarities are clear: rowdy young men who often see fighting 
opposing fans as more of the attraction than the actual soccer game. Across Europe it 
seems that without adequate security or police presence during a match with a large 
                                                        
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Millwall riot stockbroker jailed, Sept. 13, 2002, BBC, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/2256132.stm (last visited Apr. 29, 2013).  
28 Steve Fosdick, Football Hooliganism, Social Issues Research Centre, 2005, available at 
http://www.sirc.org/publik/fvexec.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
29 Giovanni Carnibella et al., Football violence in Europe, July 1996, Social Issues Research Centre, at 10, 
available at http://www.sirc.org/publik/football_violence.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
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turnout, the stadium is often a tinderbox waiting to ignite into an explosion.
30
 However, 
rarely in Europe do fans specifically target police; rather, they usually fight each other.
31
 
Most clashes with police usually occur when police forces attempt to prevent fights 
before or after a match.
32
 
Egyptian “Ultras” 
Though alcohol is not a clear indicator of violence in Europe, when considering 
the ultra movement in Egypt, one should subtract alcohol almost entirely from the 
equation.
33
 Egyptians are mostly Muslim, and since President Morsi has come to power, 
restrictions on the relatively scarce alcohol supply have been enacted.
34
 Though tourists 
in Egypt can access alcohol, Egyptian locals are discouraged from drinking for social 
reasons, and due to the new alcohol taxes consuming alcohol in excess is becoming 
prohibitively expensive.
35
  
In Egypt, intense soccer fans are known as “ultras”, and though often termed 
“hooligans” by the media, they are more appropriately termed as “ultras”.36 The ultras as 
a general movement aim to support football teams.
37
 Each chapter of ultras supports its 
favored team by attending all games both home and away, dedicating their time, effort 
                                                        
30 Nick Jardine, Bruisings, Burnings and Beatings: Europe’s Worst Soccer Hooligans, Sept. 28, 2011, 
BUSINESS INSIDER, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/europes-worst-soccer-hooligans-2011-
9?op=1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Oliver Smith, Egypt’s alcohol ban raises tourism doubts, Feb. 15, 2013, THE TELEGRAPH, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/9872242/Egypts-alcohol-ban-raises-tourism-doubts.html (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
34 Id.  
35 Patrick Kingsley, Egypt’s Islamist rulers get tough on alcohol, Mar. 24, 2013, THE GUARDIAN, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/24/egyptian-alcohol-sales-cairo (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
36 Montague, supra note 2. 
37 Heba Elkayal, The Ultras White Knights: Football hooliganism or social movement?, Sept. 16, 2011, 
DAILY NEWS EGYPT, available at http://www.masress.com/en/dailynews/132718 (last visited Apr. 30, 
2013). 
 7 
and personal money to funding their support for the team.
38
 “They don’t simply stop at 
football,” says blogger and political pundit Mahmoud Salem, “they actually have a 
philosophy and stand for a number of values and are not simply football hooligans. 
Theirs is a way of life, a subculture with its own rules, music and art. That makes them 
very unique”.39 Because of deep loyalty to fellow members, “Ultras” groups have 
traditionally attracted young people who found in them a form of safe refuge.
40
 No 
similar rapport exists between them and family members or with official institutions.
41
 
Sociologist Soumia Noumane Guessous says: “we are dealing here with young people 
with no sense of direction. They tend to identify with groups with high sense of 
solidarity, such as those of religious extremists and fanatical sports fans. They may even 
be co-opted by gangs.”42 
The Egyptian ultras were instrumental in the overthrow of former Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak (which I discuss in more depth infra).
43
 The ultras had been 
known to be prone to clashes with police forces in Egypt for decades before the 
Revolution.
44
 Former President Mubarak allowed soccer hooligans to vent their anger and 
they became hardened and experienced in fighting the police.
45
 However, until recently 
                                                        
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Oussama Romdhani, Football violence in North Africa is not all about the game, Apr. 28, 2013, AL 
ARABIYA, available at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/africa/2013/04/28/Football-violence-in-
North-Africa-is-not-all-about-the-game.html (last visited May 1, 2013). 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Malika Bilal, Egypt’s ‘Ultras’ pitch in a Tahrir protest, ALJAZEERA, Nov. 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/11/201111284912960586.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
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the ultras have been notoriously media shy, even “anti-media” in order to keep their 
identities secret, presumably to avoid unwanted police attention.
46
  
In a post-Revolution Egypt, the ultras have received increased media attention, 
been more visible in the streets and in the political scene, and have organized their own 
political party.
47
 The Egyptian ultras have thus far refrained from adopting the right-wing 
ideology of some of their counterparts overseas, or the nihilistic violence common to 
European soccer hooligans.
48
 “We are normal people. We love our country, our club and 
our group. We are fighting for freedom. That was the common thing between the 
revolutionaries and the ultras. We were fighting for freedom in the stadiums. The 
Egyptian people were fighting for freedom. We invested our ideas and feelings in 
revolution,” said Ahmed Fondu, co-founder of one of the Egyptian ultra groups.49 
Though their political goals remain unclear, what is clear is that Egyptian ultras are 
battle-hardened and ready to fight for their agenda, whatever that may be. 
Algeria-Egypt 2009 
 
 One of the most notable examples of former President Mubarak’s leniency 
towards soccer hooliganism occurred during the World Cup Playoffs.
50
 In November 
2009, Egyptian civilians attacked a bus full of Algerian soccer players on their way to 
play a match against the Egyptian national team.
51
 Egyptian soccer fans threw stones at 
                                                        
46 Id.  
47 Dina Demrdash, Egypt’s Ultra football fans found new political party, Jan. 5, 2012, BBC ARABIC, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16435132 (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).  
48 Dorsey, supra note 3. 
49 Id.  
50 Abiagain Hauslohner, The Political Fallout of Egypt’s Soccer War, Nov. 22, 2009, TIME WORLD, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1942089,00.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
51 Egypt fans stone Algeria players, Nov. 13, 2009, CNN, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/SPORT/football/11/13/football.algeria.egypt.violence/ (last visited Apr. 29, 
2013). 
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the team bus as it arrived in Cairo for the match, injuring three of the Algerian players.
52
 
So many huge rocks were apparently hurled at the team bus on its way from the airport 
that several windows were smashed and three Algerian players arrived at their hotel 
drenched in blood.
53
 Foreign journalists and bystanders commented that “you'd have 
thought Egypt had won a war”, as thousands of Cairenes took to the streets of the capital 
bearing the national flag amid a pulsing, chaotic celebration of pounding drums, blaring 
car horns and exploding fireworks on sidewalks.
54
 Buses were commandeered, and mobs 
ran screaming through the streets.
55
 The game ended and Egypt defeated Algeria 2-0.
56
  
After Egypt lost the second playoff match against Algeria in Khartoum, the 
government withdrew its ambassador from Algiers and accused Algerians of menacing 
Egyptian fans after the game.
57
 “[Mubarak] gave the game a sort of political character,” 
said Mustapha al-Sayyid, a political scientist at Cairo University.
58
 “Official newspapers 
depicted the encounter between the two teams as something very decisive, very 
important”.59 Mubarak’s eldest son, Alaa, a wealthy businessman, sounded as if he were 
calling his nation to war; “we were being humiliated and we can’t be silent about what 
happened there,” he said in a telephone call to Egypt’s most popular television talk 
                                                        
52 Robert Mackey, Violence Flares Ahead of Algeria-Egypt Soccer Match, Nov. 13, 2009, available at 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/egypt-and-algeria-brace-for-match-of-hate-sequel/ (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
53 Christian Lowe, Algeria footballers hurt ahead of Egypt game, REUTERS, Nov. 12, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/12/soccer-world-algeria-idUSLC7252320091112 (last visited Apr. 
29, 2013). 
54 Abigail Hauslohner, Cairo Braces for a Soccer Bombshell, Nov. 18, 2009, TIME WORLD, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1939954,00.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Martin Peretz, A Soccer Riot in Egypt and the Ongoing Human Catastrophe in Syria, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Feb. 5, 2012, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/100414/soccer-riot-in-egypt-and-
the-ongoing-human-catastrophe-in-syria# (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).  
58 Hauslohner, supra note 50. 
59 Id.  
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show.
60
 “We have to take a stand. This is enough. That’s it, this is enough. Egypt should 
be respected. We are Egyptian and we hold our head high, and whoever insults us should 
be smacked on his head.”61  
In the aftermath, Egyptian and foreign observers marveled at a level of 
nationalistic fervor and mass mobilization rarely seen before, and at a time when 
Mubarak was facing a rising tide of domestic dissent.
62
 “Football is the opium of the 
people,” said Hossam el-Hamalawy, an Egyptian journalist.63 “Both Egypt and Algeria 
have been going through severe economic turmoil recently, in addition to political crises. 
What better way to divert the people’s attention than a football war?”64 A few days later 
the government sent out a signal that it was time to stop, that perhaps things had gone too 
far.
65
 The Foreign Ministry said the government would not “tolerate violations against 
Algerian interests” in Egypt, and the unrest slowly stopped.66  
Egyptian Revolution 
 
Under the rule of former President Hosni Mubarak, opposition was ruthlessly 
crushed.
67
 Before the Revolution, Mubarak was as strong as he had ever been and the 
idea that an Arab Spring could sweep him from power was impossible to imagine.
68
 But 
in two spheres, two very different groups were given space to breathe before the 
Revolution: the Muslim Brotherhood in the mosque and the Ultras in the football 
                                                        
60 Michael Slackman, This Time, Egyptain Riot Over Soccer, Not Bread, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/world/africa/21egypt.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
61 Id.  
62 Hauslohner, supra note 58. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Slackman, supra note 60. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Montague, supra note 2. 
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stadium.
69
 The soccer pitches, as well as mosques, are two centers in which dissent and 
opposition to the regime thrived, hence the symbolic importance of football in Egypt.
70
 
Every weekend the ultras of Egyptian football would ignite rivalries between 
local clubs but more importantly, they would fight the heavy-handed police that became 
symbolic of Mubarak's authoritarian rule.
71
 As one Egyptian football journalist explained, 
“[t]he battle we fought was against the tear gas and rubber bullets that they launched at us 
prior to the revolution when we were prevented from cheering and supporting our team… 
This was a battle we had to fight during the January revolution to end the war between 
the police and us. So it wasn’t about football, it was about fighting for freedom [of 
expression].”72 Signs began to appear proclaiming: ACAB or “All Cops Are Bastards”.73 
Leaders of the ultras were arbitrarily arrested and detained because the chants of the 
crowds were becoming increasingly anti-government as the violence increased in the 
days leading up to the Revolution.
74
  
The Arab Spring first ignited in Tunisia after a man named Mohammed Boazizi 
self-immolated in front of the municipal offices in the town of Sidi Bouzid.
75
 His act of 
self-immolation was done out of personal frustration rather than for political reasons. 
However, it ignited a revolution, which spread across the region like wildfire.
76
 Within 
                                                        
69 Id.  
70 Jais Mehaji, Egypt: Revolutionary Football, Feb. 8, 2012, GRAPHITE PUBLICATIONS, available at 
http://graphitepublications.com/egypt-revolutionary-football/ (last visited May 4, 2013).  
71 Id.  
72 Elkayal, supra note 37.   
73 Bilal, supra note 43. 
74 Montague, supra note 69. 
75 Peter Beaumont, Mohammed Bouazizi: the dutiful son whose death changed Tunisia’s fate, Jan. 20, 
2011, THE GUARDIAN, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/20/tunisian-fruit-seller-
mohammed-bouazizi (last visited May 2, 2013).  
76 Id.  
 12 
months, Tunisia had ousted its authoritarian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali after 23 
years of rule and protests in other Arab countries including Egypt had begun.
77
  
The ultras were largely considered to be apolitical before the events of Tahrir 
Square, but were known for their rowdy behavior, obscene chants and apparently endless 
enthusiasm for clashes with the often-brutal Egyptian police.
78
 “There is no competition 
in politics, so competition moved to the soccer pitch. We do what we have to do against 
the rules and regulations when we think they are wrong,” an El Ahly ultra said after his 
group overran a police barricade trying to prevent it from bringing flares, fireworks and 
banners into the stadium.
79
 “You don’t change things in Egypt talking about politics. 
We’re not political, the government knows that and has to deal with us,” he added.80 
However, as the first waves of protesters entered Tahrir Square, the ultras joined the 
revolt against Mr. Mubarak, taunting and harassing the police as they tried to crack down 
on thousands of other marchers heading for Cairo’s Tahrir Square.81  
The first major protest in Egypt was planned for Cairo’s Tahrir Square on January 
25, 2011.
82
 The day before the protest, the two leading ultra groups in Cairo issued 
statements on their Facebook pages stressing that they were non- political organizations, 
but that their members were free as individuals to participate in the protests.
83
 “The group 
emphasizes that its members are free in their political choices,” said the statement by the 
                                                        
77 Id.  
78 David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Soccer Riot Kills More Than 70, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/world/middleeast/scores-killed-in-egyptian-soccer-
mayhem.html?_r=0 (last visited, Apr. 8, 2013). 
79 Dorsey, supra note 4. 
80 Id.  
81 Demrdash, supra note 47.  
82 Dorsey, supra note 3. 
83 Id.  
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Ultras Ahlawy, supporters of the Ahly club.
84
 Privately, both groups told their followers 
that the demonstration was what they had been working towards in four years of almost 
weekly clashes with security forces in the stadiums of Cairo.
85
 The ultras, unlike most 
other groups in Tahrir Square, were braced for violent confrontations.
86
 “We fought for 
our rights in the stadium for four years. That prepared us for this day. We told our people 
that this was our litmus test. Failure was not an option,” said one ultra leader.87 
Protest organizers said that the ultras had played a key role in the Battle of the 
Camels, helping to beat back mobs of Mubarak supporters in a daylong battle of rocks 
and gasoline bombs.
88
 With few groups in Egyptian society having any experience in 
resisting the police, the ultras found themselves on the front line and helped other 
protesters break down barriers of fear that had kept them from confronting the regime in 
the past.
89
 “We were in the front line. When the police attacked we encouraged people. 
We told them not to run or be afraid. We started firing flares. People took courage and 
joined us, they know that we understand injustice and liked the fact that we fight the 
devil,” said Mohamed Hassan, a leader of the Ultras White Knights.90 
During the 18-day occupation of Tahrir Square, the battle experience of the ultras 
was evident in the organization and social services that they helped to establish.
91
 
Protestors were assigned tasks and wore masking tape on which they were identified by 
their role, such as medic or media contact.
92
 The ultras patrolled the perimeters of the 
                                                        
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Kirkpatick, supra note 78. 
89 Dorsey, supra note 3. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
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square and controlled entry and manned the front lines in clashes with security forces and 
pro-government supporters.
93
 Years of confrontation with security forces prepared them 
for the struggle for control of the square when the president’s loyalists employed brute 
force in a bid to dislodge them.
94
 The ultras’ battle order included designated rock 
hurlers, specialists in turning over and torching vehicles for defensive purposes, and a 
quartermaster crew delivering projectiles like clockwork on cardboard platters.
95
 Pro-
democracy activists welcomed the ultras.
96
 “In fact, the ultras, the football fans’ 
associations, have played a more significant role than any political movement on the 
ground at this moment. Maybe we should let the ultras rule the country,” said Alaa Abd 
El Fatah, an Egyptian blogger and activist.
97
  
Mubarak eventually left power, but more than 800 protesters were killed during 
the Tahrir Square demonstrations.
98
 Since President Morsi has stepped into power, not a 
single police officer or security official has been held accountable for those killed during 
the demonstrations, which has increased the unpopularity of the police and security 
forces among the ultras as well as among the general population.
99
 Since the end of the 
Revolution, clashes with police and security forces have become more commonplace, 
more violent, and more deadly.
100
 The pressure for reform of the police and security 
forces has been further fueled by the release of a human rights report that concluded, “the 
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Egyptian police continue to systematically deploy violence and torture, and at times even 
kill. Although the January revolution was sparked in large part by police practices and 
vocally demanded an end to these practices, accountability for all offenders and the 
establishment of permanent instruments to prevent their recurrence, two years after the 
revolution the situation remains unchanged.”101  
Israeli Embassy Riots 
 
After the overthrow of former President Mubarak, Egyptian national pride was at 
an all-time high, and was turned toward a familiar enemy: the Jewish state of Israel.
102
 
Despite 32 years of peace under the Camp David Accords, Egyptian national pride 
remains tied to the country’s previous wars with Israel, and their subsequent quick defeat 
in the military ventures.
103
 A terrorist attack by Palestinian radicals on Israeli tourists at 
Eilat, Israel’s southernmost city on August 18, 2011, which killed 8 civilians, elicited an 
Israeli response that led to the deaths of about 15 Palestinians.
104
 Five Egyptian border 
guards (i.e. troops) were caught in the crossfire, provoking intense anger in Cairo.
105
 
Egyptians were rallied to the streets on Sept. 9 for protests that were dubbed as a 
step toward "correcting the path of the revolution."
106
 But anger over a political 
transformation that has been slow in coming turned into an attack on the Israeli Embassy 
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in Cairo that dramatically altered the course of Egypt's domestic uprising.
107
 The angry 
crowd was a combination of ultras and pro-democracy protesters who have two common 
enemies: the police and Israel.
108
  
The ultras burned the first two trucks they came across, and claimed their victory 
as they ran out of the trucks, waving two stolen machine guns, tear gas bombs, helmets, 
and protective gear.
109
 The Giza police headquarters was the next target of the 
protesters.
110
 The provocative, organized tone and lyrical structure of the chants were 
reported as resembling what one might hear in an Egyptian soccer stadium.
111
 "You don't 
want to involve football hooligans into politics, or piss them off," Adel Bassiouni, a 
civilian onlooker was quoted as saying, as he shielded his head from the flying rocks.
112
 
The headquarters went up in flames and burned for approximately a half-hour before 
firefighters contained the fire.
113
 Police forces fired tear gas, and warning gunshots 
echoed in the air nonstop in a 13-hour battle before the conflict was finally put to rest.
114
 
The demonstrators also tore down a recently constructed wall built to protect the embassy 
and invaded the building.
115
 Some 450 persons were wounded, and the scene in front of 
the embassy looked like a war zone, with cars set on fire.
116
 
After the violence, law-enforcement officials pulled an Egyptian affiliate of the 
Qatar-based satellite news channel Al Jazeera off the air on Sunday as Egypt's interim 
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leadership struggled to deflect blame onto foreign media for a violent attack on the Israeli 
embassy.
117
 "The fear of the outside continues to dominate the discourse and the actions 
now for the military council," said Hossam Bahgat, a pro-democracy activist and the 
director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights.
118
 "This is typical of security 
agencies under Mubarak: They always seek to keep independent media outlets and 
human-rights organizations on fragile grounds so that they can always decide when to 
stop tolerating these independent voices."
119
 
Port Said Massacre 
 
In February 2012, at least 73 people were killed when fans of rival teams brawled 
at the Port Said stadium in Egypt.
120
 After the underdog team El Masry came from behind 
to win in a 3-1 upset, its fans stormed the field, chasing Al Ahly’s players back to their 
locker room and attacking its fans with knives, clubs and stones.
121
 During this panic, 
spectators as well as staff died from head concussions, asphyxiation, and other injuries 
from stampeding and trampling.
122
 The police around the stadium appeared unable or 
unwilling to control the violence, and video footage showed officers standing idle as the 
melee exploded.
123
 Other eyewitnesses claim that security was largely absent when the 
Masry fans stormed the field, or alternatively that they allowed Masry fans to enter to 
visitor team’s stands.124 Some attribute the police inaction to Al Ahly’s role working with 
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ultras from Cairo’s other leading club to fight back against the police in the revolution’s 
first days.
125
 Some Egyptian activists like Mostafa Hussein have speculated that the 
violence against the club’s players and fans was allowed to play out in revenge for the 
team’s past clashes with police.126 The incident is widely seen as having been precipitated 
by the police and security forces, which are despised by many fans who regard them as 
the enforcers of the Mubarak regime’s repression, as well as of the military rulers who 
succeeded Mubarak.
127
 
The Port Said case goes to the core of the need for reform of state institutions still 
rooted in the era of toppled President Hosni Mubarak.
128
 Most people in Egypt believe 
that the lethal fight between fans of the home team, Al Masry, and the Cairo club, Al 
Ahly, and between fans and the police, was planned rather than spontaneous.
129
 “There 
was something planned our security knew about it. People were tweeting before the 
match. I saw a tweet with my own eyes 13 to 14 hours before the match in which a Masri 
fan was telling Ahly supporters: ‘If you are coming to the match, write your will before 
you come,’” said Diaa Salah, a member of the women’s committee of the Egyptian 
Football Federation (EFA).
130
 “The government is getting back at the ultras. They are 
saying: ‘you protest against us, you want democracy and freedom. Here is a taste of your 
democracy and freedom,” Ms. Salah said.131   
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The fact that the riots are emblematic of a precarious domestic situation and a 
mirror for the street’s discontent and disaffection is a very telling picture indeed.132 It is 
still too early to tell whether the attacks were deliberately allowed, or whether police 
negligence was simply a result of a post-revolutionary security vacuum.
133
 That riot, 
along with other acts of violence and vandalism, has brought additional attention to 
Egypt's "ultras", and "have added a volatile element" to post-Mubarak Egypt.
134
  
Incredibly, some ultras have fused their passion for soccer with a "jihadist mentality."
135
 
At least that is what a Facebook page devoted to the Ultras Yellow Dragons is now 
marketing.
136
 The Ultras Yellow Dragons are fans of the Ismaily Sporting Club, which is 
based in Ismailia, a city in northeastern Egypt on the west bank of the Suez Canal.
137
 
Black Bloc 
 
Those people that were instrumental in encouraging the Port Said riots were put 
on trial.
138
 As the city braced for a court ruling about responsibility for the deadly riot at 
Port Said, security forces fled the city and turned over their burned-out headquarters — 
as well as sole responsibility for public safety — to the military.139 The few local police 
stations where the staff was still present “suspended” their work, officers said, in what 
                                                        
132 Mehaji, supra note 70. 
133 Id.  
134 Kirkpatick, supra note 120. 
135 Thomas Joscelyn, Social Media Jihad: Soccer fanatics with a ‘jihadist mentality’, LONG WAR JOURNAL, 
Apr. 1, 2013, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2013/04/social_media_jihad_soccer_hool.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
136 Ultras Yellow Dragons – Uyd07, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/UltrasYellowDragons07?fref=ts (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
137 Joscelyn, supra note 135. 
138 Sarah Lynch, 37 dead in Egypt riot after verdict in soccer deaths, Jan. 27, 2013, USA TODAY, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/26/egypt-soccer-death-penalty/1866025/ (last 
visited May 7, 2013).  
139 David D. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, As Crisis Deepens in Egypt After Ruling on Riot, Calls for a 
Military Coup, Mar. 9, 2013, THE NEW YORK TIMES, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/egypt-sentences-2012-soccer-
riot.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited May 7, 2013). 
 20 
appeared to be part of a widening strike by police officers and security forces across the 
country.
140
 Though police and security officials were also involved in the violence and 
killings of fans during the riot, 21 soccer fans were sentenced to death, whereas only 2 
security officials were given jail time.
141
 After the sentence was read, two policemen 
were shot dead outside Port Said’s main prison when angry relatives tried to storm the 
facility to free the defendants.
142
 Police fired tear gas and rubber bullets, as well as live 
rounds, at the crowd outside the prison.
143
 In other parts of the city, residents tried to 
storm the governor’s office, police stations, the power station and the main court 
building.
144
 People chanted for a military coup to overthrow the current Islamist 
government lead by President Morsi.
145
 Overall, around 300 people were injured and 
about 37 were killed.
146
  
In Cairo, hard-core soccer fans initially cheered the death sentences to their rivals 
in Port Said, but then shifted to anger at the police acquittals.
147
 They burned the 
headquarters of the Egyptian soccer federation and the ornate Police Officers Club, a 
complex of pink buildings including a restaurant, a wedding hall and a hotel.
148
 “Step 
aside! We are here for the police,” the soccer fans storming the club told its staff.149 The 
police were nowhere to be found during the attack, and employees said that many of the 
club’s members had stayed home in anticipation of violence after the verdict.150 
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Since the reaction to the sentence for the ultras, increased police violence has 
sparked the emergence of the Black Bloc. The Black Bloc is a group of protesters 
reminiscent of football hooligans and anarchists in Europe and Latin America, believed 
to largely consist of ultras who dress in black and whose faces are concealed by black 
masks, a tactic used by the fans during the revolt against Mubarak.
151
 The group vowed 
through a Facebook page to protect demonstrators against the security forces and what 
they termed ‘ruling Muslim Brotherhood thugs’, a reference to Brotherhood supporters 
who attacked demonstrators in December 2012 in front of the presidential palace.
152
 The 
bloc said in a statement on its official Facebook page that they can no longer stand still 
towards the government’s “campaigns against the revolution’s youth.”153 Also on their 
Facebook page, the activists say they are a "generation born of the blood of the martyrs" 
from the 2011 revolution that toppled former president Hosni Mubarak.
154
 Originating 
out of a plan to protect women protesters from sexual assault, this huge band of men and 
women numbering in the thousands (the exact number is not known) form a dedicated 
and determined corps of combatants divided into local groups of 30-50 individuals in 
Egypt's communities.
155
 The Black Bloc mission is to ensure that no more assaults, 
kidnappings, and torture occur from Morsi's security forces (the Muslim Brotherhood 
militia) and so-called law enforcement, and that a "camel gazwa," (invading crowds on 
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galloping camels) as in the early days of the revolt, never takes place again.
156
 Many 
Black Bloc members carry firearms, most likely acquired through the illegal networks 
smuggling weapons from Libya and Gaza.
157
 
Egypt's Black Bloc grew out of the chaos of President Morsi's actions, which 
necessitated a course correction – such as the use of security, weaponry and attacks -- for 
freedom-fighters in their struggle for liberation from an authoritarian system.
158
 Egypt's 
fighters do not seek anarchy; they are not fighting just to fight.
159
 Furthermore, the 
Shariah religious state is contrary to the western democratic state, and the roles of their 
respective revolts find their meaning and identity by way of the system they fight, not the 
tactics and strategies they use.
160
 
If the best defense is a good offense, the forceful Black Bloc has aggressively 
expanded its scope beyond the scene of gathered protesters and their protection.
161
 With a 
physical presence in more than eight cities across Egypt, the anonymous soldiers have 
claimed responsibility for ransacking at least eight separate Muslim Brotherhood 
Freedom and Justice Party offices.
162
 Black Bloc soldiers lock arms to create a human 
shield in defense of pro-freedom protesters -- the Black Bloc's number-one priority -- in 
the streets and squares of Egypt.
163
 In keeping with their mission statement, Egypt's 
Black Bloc members claim they have nothing against state institutions per se, "but 
against control by a particular system, the supremacy of a certain group."
164
 They further 
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contend that "the best thing is to hit the existing system and its economy by sabotaging 
the system's institutions and not ones belonging to the public."
165
  
In April 2013, Egyptian public prosecutor Talaat Ibrahim ordered the detention of 
22 suspected Black Bloc members accused of funding the mysterious group.
166
 The group 
of masked young protesters has been linked to violent attacks on public and private 
properties, and present themselves as the defenders of protesters opposed to President 
Mohamed Morsi’s rule, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood.167 In late April 2013, 
Egyptian police arrested 12 members of the Black Bloc after clashes outside Cairo's 
presidential palace.
168
 Protesters hurled rocks and firebombs at the walls of the 
presidential palace in Heliopolis, and torched a police vehicle.
169
 Since April, other 
members of the Black Bloc have been labeled terrorists and have been arrested and 
detained.
170
  
Affects on the future of Egyptian politics 
 
"Egyptians are very worried about what is happening because they feel the 
country is getting into a very difficult situation," said Said Sadek, professor of political 
sociology at the American University in Cairo.
171
 "Any revolution is like an earthquake, 
with aftershocks," Sadek said. "So we have aftershocks continuing from time to time, and 
the country will be very unstable for at least four to five years."
172
 The unparalleled levels 
of football violence in Egypt reveal something structurally deeper than a simple 
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outpouring of violence after a soccer game.
173
 Egypt’s Premier League football will serve 
as a barometer of President Morsi’s political performance in the months ahead.174 The 
ultras demand that President Morsi do better in coping with key issues, including reform 
of the hated police and security forces and their role in the new Egypt, holding those 
responsible for the death of hundreds of protesters in the last two years accountable and 
rooting out corruption.
175
 So far, the barometer shows a mixed record at best.
176
 "The 
Egyptian Football Association (EFA) and the clubs' managements should reach out to 
fans in order to avoid unrest inside and outside the stadiums," the soccer association 
said.
177
 
Much of the post-Mubarak violence stems from clashes between the militants and 
security forces.
178
 Their battle is a battle for karama, or dignity, and their dignity is 
vested in their ability to stand up to the dakhliya, or interior ministry, the knowledge that 
they no longer can be abused by security forces without recourse and the fact that they no 
longer have to pay off each and every policemen to stay out of trouble.
179
 That dignity is 
unlikely to be fully restored until the police and security forces have been reformed - a 
task Mr. Morsi's government has so far largely shied away from.
180
 Official foot-dragging 
in holding security officers accountable as in the case of Port Said and the deaths of 
hundreds of protesters in the last two years reinforces the perception of the police and 
security forces as an institution that in the words of scholars Eduardo P. Archetti and 
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Romero Amilcar is "exclusively destined to harm, wound, injure, or, in some cases, kill 
other persons." It gives "police power... the aura of omnipotence" who "at the same time 
lost all legitimacy both in moral and social terms. To resist and to attack the police force 
is thus seen as morally justified," they argue.
181
 
Reforming the police however is no mean task and is likely to prove far more 
difficult than Mr. Morsi's taming of the military last summer by sidelining the country's 
two most senior military commanders with the help of the next echelon of officers.
182
 
Reform will have to mean changing from top to bottom the culture of a force that is 
larger than the military and counts 450,000 policemen and 350,000 members of the 
General Security and Central Security Forces.
183
 Ending football violence requires 
establishing new rules of engagement.
184
 New generations must come to believe they 
have a stake in the future of the country, and that uninhibited expression can be peaceful 
and lawful.
185
 What is certain, however, is that Egypt is still in the midst of severe 
turmoil with the gap between the revolutionary “street” and the police authorities yet to 
be redressed.
186
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